Of Queen’s Counsels &”Seniors”

I feel there should be no Senior Advocates only advocates.

Endowment not habiliment is the test of a lawyer. He should be recognised by his performance not his robes and his identity should lie in his work not attire. The gown does not make a lawyer. An incompetent lawyer will only disgrace it while the competent should not need it.

As long as the system remains it is liable to be exploited. A lawyer who is not designated can be run down as being incapable and be unjustifiably compared unfavourably with another who is designated aside from being denied priority in appearance in court despite superior capacity while the incapable can perpetually hide their incapacity in their robes and get undeserved preference when in fact they should be denied an audience altogether.

There is a hike in fees immediately upon designation despite want of any improvement in the quality of work. A non-designated lawyer has to explain (often without success) even a warranted increase in his charges. This not only shoots the cost of litigation up without any corresponding improvement in the quality of practise but adversely affects the quality itself as more effort is placed on the race for designation through networking rather than working.

Preference is often shown to senior advocates in courts and in some it becomes the very condition for practise. Aside from being anti-merit this is also anti-democratic as it not only stifles potential it entrenches established interests.

It is a little known fact that Francis Bacon was the first person to be so appointed and that too for reasons having nothing to do with his undisputed versatility. Till his appointment the Attorney General, Solicitor General and King’s Sergeants were Kings Counsel in Ordinary. Queen Elizabeth appointed Francis Bacon Queen’s Counsel Extraordinary. The reason for this extraordinary honour was only political and intended to prevent him from acting against the Crown. The appointment as Kings Counsel therefore had nothing to do with the admitted capabilities of Bacon – a trend which continues till today.

Distinction never needs any dressing up. It is self-evident.

Merit is always humble. It makes a place for itself without having to be ushered in.

Ability requires no badge of honour. It attracts attention without a formal proclamation.

And true recognition lies not in formal acknowledgment but in voluntary appreciation.

So where do we fit designation of Senior Advocates?

The Case for KOHINOOR

The statement made in the Supreme Court of India on the Kohinoor diamond is astonishing and is contrary both to history and law.
Kohinoor was part of loot not “gift” and the very circumstances surrounding the Last Treaty of Lahore by which it is claimed that the diamond was ceded to the Queen of Victoria – the Last Treaty of Lahore was signed immediately after the Second Anglo-Sikh War and Duleep Singh who handed over the diamond was but a child – showed that the “gift” was anything but voluntary! And the law too permits the making and enforcing of the claim for return of Kohinoor to India.
In Resolution 3187 of 1973 The General Assembly, deploring removal during colonial or foreign occupation of objects d art, declared that  “the prompt restitution to a country of its objets d’art, monuments, pieces, manuscripts and documents […], is calculated to strengthen international co-operation inasmuch as it constitutes just reparation for damage done”.
The Resolution recognises the customary rule of prohibition against the use of force recognised in several instruments of international law commencing from the Final Act of the Congress of Vienna of 1815 to the Hague Conventions, UN Charter and the UNESCO Convention of 1970 and subsequent developments.
Opponents of the restoration of cultural artefacts rely on the fact that East India Company was a private corporation and India was not a colony of the British at the relevant time. They also rely on the principle of inter-temporal law according to which the issues should be assessed not on the basis of existing international rules but law in force at the relevant time.
Neither submission can prevail.

The site of the Parliament of UK has a section Parliament and Empire. It records that East India Company Loan Act and the East India Company Regulating Act made it possible for the government in Britain o extend a loan to the Company in exchange for recognition of the British state’s ultimate authority over the Indian territories.It leased to the Company continued political control of its Indian territory in exchange for a payment of £40,000 every two years. It also established the post of governor-general who, with a council of four members, was to have overall authority over the Company’s territories. More government control came with the India Act of 1784, under Prime Minister William Pitt. This created a committee of six government appointees, known as the Board of Control, who were to monitor and direct the Company’s policies. The government was also to have the final decision on the Company’s nominations for its officials in India. This and a further new law passed in 1786 greatly increased the authority of the governor-general over other Company officials. The ultimate control therefore lay with the government itself and liability cannot be disclaimed on the ground that East India Company, which in any event was established by Royal Charter, was merely a private company.

The inter-temporal principle cannot apply to human rights obligations. Cultural artefacts are part of the nation’s heritage and constitute its identity and the right to this cultural patrimony both tangible and intangible is basic to human dignity and indispensable for social and cultural progress. The very moral dimension of it makes it a human right. The instruments dealing with this subject, therefore, could not be said to define the norm but merely declared what already existed as an autonomous and binding principle.

It is sometimes also said that there can be competing claims by the Iranians or Afghans whose rulers held the diamond at different times. The diamond however came from the Kollur mine in Andhra Pradesh, India which was the only one to produce it at that time. As right to cultural artefacts is an imprescriptible human right and there is an obligation to return on all who may have acquired this physical cultural artefact by force the diamond has to eventually return to Indian territory no matter how many hands it may have passed through. Such artefacts are not considered private property and there is an obligation to preserve them within the territory to which they belong.

Interestingly the statement reportedly made by  in the Supreme Court was “If we claim our treasures like Kohinoor from other countries, every other nation will start claiming their items from us. There will be nothing left in our museums.” Ironically David Cameroon had used almost the same words when he came to India in 2010; he said,”If you say yes to one you suddenly find the British Museum would be empty. I am afraid to say, it is going to have to stay put”. 

It is not a question of which museum gets empty. Its the issue as to which museum is the right custodian of the artefact. And Kohinoor belongs to India.

 

Prince William, Kate, Diana Bench & Taj Mahal

I wonder why a request was made to remove the scaffolding from the pillars of Taj Mahal for Prince William-Kate Middleton photograph. The scaffolding was as much a symbol of love as the monument itself. After all the sentiment behind fixing what needs repairs (whether a monument or a relationship) can be love only!

But it seems those making the request had a different sense of both history and love.

William’s advice to the royal photographer who took their picture thus was, “I hope you got the symmetry right”! So symmetry can prevail over chemistry and can still be love. It is interesting to know, as has been written by Anant Kumar in Case Reports in Women’s Health (Volume 1-2, January-June 2014), that Mumtaz Mahal died of complications from repeated child-birth from what are preventable causes of maternal mortality many of which continue till today. Shah Jahan chose not to spend money to address those problems but built the monument instead. I doubt William was aware of it but in a way Taj can be symbolised in symmetry even after the chemistry is over!

Perhaps thats why there is a Diana Bench at Taj. The solitary figure of Diana sitting on the bench hinted loneliness and isolation and Diana separated from Charles just a few months later. I am sure Mumtaz Mahal would squirm in her grave when she sees that bench. Appropriately(?) a photoshoot on it is with one’s back to the Taj Mahal. In any case the dead are history. Why bother about them! The monument stands and symmetry counts.

Lord William Bentinck apparently felt the same way much before the Diana Bench. If he had had his way the Taj Mahal would have been dismantled in 1835 and its marble auctioned. Besides nothing that is native is important. Just like the 50 million lives lost to famines under British Raj. Bentinck had no qualms about dismantling the whole edifice. So William’s generation’s lack of concern for the minarets should not be much of a surprise.

In any event history does not necessarily mean going back in time! Surely not when you are a Royal.

A possible explanation  for the request is the distortion of the time-space continuum. It presumed we are still in colonial times and the Queen of England is the Empress of India. Or perhaps there was movement forward in time with Prince William becoming not only King but the ruler of India. After all Royals can do no wrong and in fact can do anything – time travel included.

There can be however another charitable explanation. Buckingham Palace, which is about 300 years old itself, was requiring urgent repairs for a long time but the the same were being deferred. It was reported that when a plumber entered the Queen’s bathroom to repair to the old-fashioned chain-pulled cistern he while trying to fix the problem leaned against the lavatory and part of the structure came away from the wall. If the former imperialist government can go slow on repair of the Palace why cannot the former colony do the same with Taj Mahal?

I wonder if the Diana Bench will be re-named now. Let Mumtaz Mahal ponder while we await the next generation of royals and another photo-shoot.

KANHAIYA – THE INTELLECTUAL

“No intellectual,” said Kanhaiya “is supporting the Modi regime.” I will not engage myself in any defending Modi (as he and his party are well equipped for the purpose) but will concentrate instead on the use of the expression “intellectual” by Kanhaiya.

There are two reasons for this exercise. Firstly there is a snobbishness in the comment which is in fact anti-intellectual and secondly the speech given by him displayed no critical nor a rational spirit of enquiry which is actually associated with intellectualism.

Kanhaiya ignores the difference between an intelligentsia and an intellectual. The former is a social class organised on the basis of shared beliefs and will include communists, socialists, conservatives and of course Kanhaiya’s favourite fascists. Disagreement with an alternative point of view will not make the holder of that point of view any less an intellectual. No one should know this better than Kanhaiya himself but his comment suggests he does not regard anyone not sharing his point of view to be an intellectual. This itself shows disregard of liberal values which he claims to espouse and a totalitarianism which he claims to oppose.

Kanhaiya makes a distinction between “emergency” and “fascism”which shows knowledge neither of history nor ideology.

Emergency, he says, is “goondaism of only one party” while “fascism” entails “using of state machinery for goondaism.” “State machinery” is ordained under the Constitution and Emergency was declared invoking Article 352 of the Constitution and the excesses of the Emergency were those of the government  which claimed to be exercising powers not of a party but of the state machinery as ordained by the Constitution. This was the use of state machinery for goondaism  which is how he describes (again wrongly) “fascism”.

Fascism, used in the sense Kanhaiya understands it, is not descriptive of any ideology but merely a pejorative term of abuse. Common ownership of means of production (envisaged by Communism) may be described by its critics as “goondaism” too and the subjective preference of one ideology over the other shows complete absence of any rational spirit of enquiry which is the hallmark of any intellectual. Is this not acting like a political commissar or an ideological administrator to control thought by using abuse not critical enquiry to deify one’s own and deride the other’s point of view? Is this not the “azadi” to impose one point of view over all others? Will this be “azadi” at all?

Significantly Kanhaiya impliedly concedes intellectuals continue to exist in India and express dissent and disapproval of what they find amiss in the system. How does this compare with Red Guards, the Chinese para-militaries who purged the country of those politically dangerous to Mao? Or the Armenian Genocide by the Ottoman Government. Or Lenin’s contempt for the intelligentsia apparent in his infamous comment “we have completed no academies.” Or again the preference of “bourgeois science” over the “proletarian science” in the old Soviet Union?

Yes, as Kanhaiya mentions, “it is important to understand history before we reach any kind of conclusion.” It is however obvious from Kanhaiya’s speech the examples he gave and the relevant examples which he ignored that he does not practice what he preaches and also knows little about what he chooses to preach!

A Reply to Afzal Guru’s Defense

Nandita Haksar in her article “Was Afzal Guru a martyr or a militant? JNU students were debating a question that law can’t” wrote against the hanging of Afzal Guru and justified the meeting at JNU protesting against the same.   It was tweeted by Ms Sagarika Ghose.

Ms Haksar commented: “In India we do not have a jury system. So people will have to make their own judgements. Many Indian citizens have adjudged Afzal Guru a terrorist, while their fellow citizens in Kashmir honour him as a martyr. The meeting on February 9 at JNU, which was organised by both Kashmiris and other Indian students, was an important bridge between these two understandings. Such bridges can be built most effectively by the youth. Ultimately, our borders have to be defended not against our enemies but against disaffection and alienation within our country.”(emphasis mine)

I do not agree with Ms Haksar’s reasoning.

Firstly, while India does not have a Jury System it has Bench Trial which is as much a legal system as the former.

Secondly, notwithstanding the absence of Jury System judgments are rendered by Courts  and “Indians do not have to make their own judgments”.

Thirdly, Indians citizens did not adjudge Afzal Guru a terrorist the legal system did.

Fourthly, the meeting could build no bridge because it shut out the contrary point of view by taking a firm position that Guru’s execution was “judicial murder” and that too surreptitiously under the guise of “poetry reading“.

Fifthly, it is because the country has to be guarded against disaffection and alienation that dogmatic denunciation of the system and that too in a covert manner must be deprecated.

Strangely, Ms Haksar in an earlier part of her article had mentioned, “As it happens, there is so far no evidence to show that Kumar ever shouted pro-Afzal Guru or pro-Maqbool Bhatt slogans at the February 9 event at JNU, which was organised to protest the hanging of 2001 Parliament attack convict Afzal Guru.” (emphasis mine) One protests when one feels wronged. Whether slogans are shouted or not the organisation of the protest suggested an identity with the point of view with the more vocal of the protesters!

Guru, Haksar says, became a martyr because he was “hanged secretly by the Indian governmentbut as hanging follows a completed adjudication how can the hanging be “judicial murder?

And while Kanhaiya did mention Afzal Guru in the speech (reproduced in Indian Express) prior to his arrest, on his release he said Rohith not Afzal Guru is his icon! Even if we ignore Kumar’s fitfulness towards serious issues, if Kanhaiya (whom Haksar describes as a “national treasure“) has forsaken Afzal Guru, is Haksar’s espousing of Guru’s cause and that too riding on Kumar’s shoulders not utterly incongruous?

It is interesting what Nandita Haksar calls “incontrovertible facts” about the Afzal Guru case. She says, “According to Afzal Guru, it was someone in the intelligence agencies who asked him to escort Mohammad to Delhi and help him find a rented room and a car.”  (emphasis mine) The incontrovertible fact is Afzal Guru’s version which incidentally never mentioned who and in which intelligence agency told him to escort  Mohammad.

Ms Haksar goes on to say, “In the light of the controversies over Ishrat Jahan, it is not entirely unthinkable that Afzal Guru, a surrendered militant, was being used by the intelligence agencies. In the West, there have been many cases in which intel agencies used former militants and even allowed them to commit acts of terror. In this case, the intelligence agencies may have been following some intel and could not prevent the attack.” Surmises and hunches thus become “incontrovertible facts!”

As far as denial of a lawyer in the Trial Court is concerned what is important to note is that he was not given death sentence by the Trial Court (where the denial of lawyer is alleged) but by the High Court (where he was duly represented) which was upheld by the Supreme Court (where he was duly represented too).

Haksar concedes that Afzal Guru “was involved in conspiracy to attack Parliament” but says “he should not have got the death penalty.” because Azhar, Baba and Ahmed absconded ignoring that in cases of conspiracy the liability is joint and the act of others is imputed to the conspirators and because Azhar, Baba and Ahmed deserved death penalty Guru could not be treated differently. The accused who was convicted for 10 years was not convicted under Section 121 (as was Guru) but under Section 123 (for which the maximum punishment is 10 years).

The Supreme Court judgment in Guru’s case runs into about 200 pages and has 339 paragraphs but only one line from the entire judgment is reproduced which says, “The incident, which resulted in heavy casualties, had shaken the entire nation and the collective conscience of the society will only be satisfied if capital punishment is awarded to the offender.” This said Nandita Haksar angered the Kashmiri people. I do not know how all the Kashmiri people converged on this one line in the judgment and do not know the empirical basis for Haksar’s conviction that this line angered them. But Ms Haksar had earlier said, “The people in Kashmir started calling Afzal Guru a martyr only after he was hanged secretly by the Indian government without giving his family an opportunity to meet him a final time.” (emphasis mine) How then could the “Kashmiri people” react to the judgment which was many years earlier?? In any event the line reproduced was not the only reason given by the Supreme Court to justify dismissal of the appeal. The Court found that the conclusion reached by the High Court both with regard to “the applicability of Section 121 IPC (Waging, Attempting or Abetting War) and punishment is correct” and detailed reasons were given for the same. The judgment was not rendered by “random men” whom Haksar referred to in Chesterton’s quote and to whom she had objection but experts, specialists in the field of law.

Ms Haksar says, “The law and the media have judged Afzal Guru as a terrorist. In defiance of this judgement, the people of Kashmir have called him a martyr. Who is in the wrong then? If sentiment overrules the law, law would require continuous speculation and would vary with personal whims. And what is the basis to primacy of any one section’s whim (in this case the Kashmiri people imagined by Ms Haksar) and will such an exercise not affect the principles of stability, fidelity and rationality which alone guarantee fairness in law?

We are not concerned with what kind of person Guru was but what Guru did. Ms Haksar does not set out the “historical injustices” which she alleges qua Guru and the random references to different thinkers is actually so, random. And they do not fit with the rest of the content.

It is good to build bridges, as Ms Haksar says, but it is not correct to create divides because those who create divides will never be serious about building bridges. When one is more serious about divides than bridges, law will always be a hinderance. And the only way to justify such extra-legal behaviour is to say, as Ms Nadita Haksar has said, that what one does is what “law cant”!

Indira Jaising & Satya Meva Jayate

Justice Pratibha Rani is not the first judge in legal history to extract lyrics of a song in a judgment.

Bob Dylan is the favourite of American Supreme Court judges.

Chief Justice Roberts lifted the lyrics from “Like a Rolling Stone” from the Highway 61 Revisited album when he said “when you got nothing you got nothing to lose” and Justice Scalia quoted Dylan’s the “times they are a-changing” in a 2010 decision.

Ms Indira Jaising is, however, offended that Justice Rani referred to a patriotic song from the movie Upkar – “Mere Desh Ki Dharti Sona Ugle Ugle Heere Moti”. According to her “there is no such offence as anti-national act in any of the statute books in India”.

If instead of looking at Satya Meva Jayate Ms Indira Jaising’s had cared to see the Indian Penal Code (the “statute book in India” defining offences) she would have noticed Chapter VI. Chapter VI sets out  “OFFENCES AGAINST THE STATE”.  These offences disturb security of state and public order and are an attack on its very existence.

“Act” is a noun. “Anti-national” is an adjective. Adjectives are describing words which name attributes of a noun.  “Anti national act” means “an act opposed to national interests.” Are offences against State not acts which have attributes opposed to national interests? Unless you choose to look away both from law and language or if you are Ms Indira Jaising they are not!

Ms Jaising does not stop there. She proceeds to ask judges “what have you done to guarantee us peace?” Judges come into the picture after the act. But when they do indeed intervene, as Justice Pratibha Rani did, lawyers like Indira Jaising say there is nothing called an anti-national act!  How then can peace ever be guaranteed? It is, however, difficult to fathom what she is saying because just a paragraph later Jaising says “We have succeeded in defending freedom zealous in  courts”! I wonder how courts can succeed when judges or the system fail. It is obvious the “judiciary” is doing its “job” but according to Ms Jaising it is not!

Ms Indira Jaising surpasses herself when she refers to the Constitution to understand what “anti-national” is. She cites Article 352 – the proclamation of emergency – to suggest that integrity of a nation can be imperilled only by “external aggression”. But pray where is the Proclamation? Does she mean to say merely because emergency cannot be imposed, an act which satisfies the ingredients of a penal offence cannot be punished? If she has her way the Indian Penal Code will have efficacy only in an Emergency. And in her scheme of things Emergency, which according to the Constitution is a transitional measure, would have permanence!

Ms Jaising refers next to ADM Jabalpur. I cannot fathom its relevance. The judgment dealt with a Presidential Order under Article 359 and also concerned the question whether Article 21 is the sole repository of personal liberty issues which have no bearing on Kanhaiya.  And in the context of the said judgment Jaising says “majoritarian (sic) is an illusion”! But the judgment, as also Kanhaiya,  had nothing to do with majoritarianism.

And after saying all this Ms Jaising asks, “Was Kanhaiya national or anti-national?” But she herself had said there is no offence called anti-national act! If she is sure of the latter why the question? And as she did ask the question there has to be cause for the doubt. Or is it that in her scheme of things there is no difference between national and anti-national. All that the bail order required was that Kanhaiya will not participate actively or passively in any activity which may anti-national. According to Ms Jaising this is “onerous, oppressive and unconstitutional”! Where will We The People (whose cause Ms Jaising espouses) go when anti-national activity (which by its nature is inimical to their interest) is according to her not unconstitutional??

Kanhaiya is accused of an offence which carries life imprisonment. His is one of the fastest bail orders in a case of such gravity and that too in a writ petition which is unprecedented not only because of the form in which his case was presented but the speed with which it was decided facilitated not the least because of the order of the Supreme Court itself.

The worth of a national motto, Ms Jaising, lies not in its being seen but in imbibing of its virtues. Satya Meva Jayate has to be present in the heart even if not visible to the eye. There may be some whose action will be askew despite looking straight at it. And there may be others who will do right without needing to stare at it. As Jaising herself said, Yato Dharma Tato Jaya!

Rohith & Kanhaiya-Of Dalits & Students

Discipline becomes a “Dalit” issue and Sedition becomes a case of “stifling students”.

Rohit was not suspended for being a Dalit but because of his protesting the hanging of Yakub Memon who was convicted for the 1993 Bombay bombings. And Kanhaiya was arrested for subversive speech which enjoys no constitutional protection and students are not exempted out of the requirement. Yet we are fed constantly with cries of injustice to “dalits” and “students“.

Does identity (being a Dalit) immunise conduct and is location (JNU campus) the sole reason for a privileged position?

It is indeed strange that while protesting social inequality a privileged position is being created in the enforced exemption from norms which are otherwise of general application.

And the cognitive dissonance – conflict arising from holding of contradictory beliefs – is replaced by doublethink – the simultaneous holding of contradictory beliefs entailing as Orwell said the repudiation of morality while laying claim to it!

Thus the very law and system disparaged in speeches and protests is invoked both by Rohith’s kin and Kanhaiya to seek protection from action and redressal of perceived grievances. Is this not hypocrisy parading as virtue which actually robs the protagonists of the moral high ground they seek to occupy?

In any event the question is not who Rohith was but what he did and the mere fact that Kanhaiya spoke in University campus will not make a subversive speech less so.

The defence of both Rohith and Kanhaiya entails deriving moralistic conclusions from evaluative premises which is nothing but a moralistic fallacy. Two illustrations will explain such a flawed approach: Dalits have been treated badly THEREFORE punishing Rohith, a Dalit, is wrong. And students need a free environment there all restraint on them is bad. Considering the opposition of this group to fanaticism such bullheaded opposition to reason is indeed unseemly and inappropriate.

And what will then happen to civic nationalism? Considering the vociferous opposition of the group to any ethnic basis of nationalism – because of the perceived threat of cultural assimilation – even civic nationalism – which deals with shared rights and deference to similar political procedures- would be endangered by such an approach  for rights will be claimed for some which are denied to others and exoneration from procedures, applicable to all, yet sought for a class. There will be no commonality of goals nor cooperative effort. With utter want of mutuality and enclaves of exclusiveness will there not be greater fragmentation of society and alienation of its members with no chance of inclusiveness or adaptability which is being invoked in the defence of both Rohith and Kanhaiya?

There is something fundamentally wrong with what is happening. Such an attitude must not be allowed to prevail. Denying both moral and civic virtues we will then move away from integration to disintegration. And this is injustice to all – not just Dalits and Students!